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ABSTRACT
In this paper, the question of whether there is a difference in voter participation
between partisan and nonpartisan ballots in municipal elections is addressed. This
study will employ statistical regression to isolate and measure voter turnout in these
two scenarios. Reforms which began in the late nineteenth century continue to have an
impact on our daily lives. The Progressive Era, which championed much social
equality for our country, has an oft overlooked darker side whose influences and
consequences remain. Specifically, the municipal reforms of the early twentieth
century. Much of the research on the topic of municipal elections has included
nonpartisan ballots, as they are included in what are known as reform cities along with
manager governments and at-large elections, to name a few. Research on nonpartisan
elections and turnout has yielded support for the notion that the implementation of
municipal reform has served to depress civic participation. However, there is not yet a
study looking solely at these variables.
The research design for this study is non-experimental. A random effects generalized
least squares regression with robust standard error adjusted for clustering of
municipalities over time was employed to test for an effect on voter turnout based on
the type of municipal ballot, partisan or non-partisan. The dependent variable is voter
turnout and is a quantitative variable. The independent variable is a categorical
qualitative variable which is defined by the presence or absent of party label on
municipal ballots. This paper addressed this deficit using Rhode Island as a case study,
as nine of the 39 municipalities are nonpartisan. Comparing turnout over five

elections, the results of this study will hopefully provide strong evidence about the
impact of nonpartisan ballots in local elections and aid in the overall discussion.
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The Legitimate Consequences of Form of Government and Nonpartisan Ballots
in Municipal Elections
INTRODUCTION
This study endeavors to evaluate the impact of various municipal structures on voter
participation. Specifically how two structures, ballot type and form of government,
effect voter registration and voter turnout in Rhode Island. My interest in studying the
topic of local elections occurred while I was in my second year as a Political Science
graduate student and after I had run my husband’s city council campaign in Newport,
RI. Having been drawn to Political Science because of my interest in social science,
human behavior, and politics and my professional work experience in the political
world, I was already an enthusiast of American Politics at the national and state levels.
Before running my husband’s city council campaign, I had a number of assumptions
about local politics. Since I was working for a Republican in a heavily Democratic
city, let alone state, I thought that the absence of party labels in a nonpartisan contest
would be beneficial for the candidate. One of the problems with this assumption about
nonpartisan municipal elections was that I concurrently assumed that the residents
would be politically and civically engaged. My experience and my scholarship led me
to reevaluate this and other thoughts about parties, partisanship, and other structural
aspects in local elections.
Through the course of my graduate program, I came across a 1952 article by Charles
Adrian titled, “General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections.” His observations
were such an accurate reflection of my experience in a nonpartisan municipality that I
felt the paper could have been written specifically about Newport present day. The
1

year of Adrian’s paper is the same year that the nonpartisan ballot, as well as other
Progressive reforms, was implemented in Newport. Adrian’s register of general
characteristics consists of eleven items, many of which have been assessed, questioned
and built upon over the past 60 years. The resonance this particular paper held for me
led me to pursue research on nonpartisan municipal elections. Further research on the
origins of nonpartisan elections and Progressive Era reforms led to an expanded scope
including municipal forms of government.
NYU political science professor, Costas Panagopoulos, in an editorial on nonpartisan
municipal elections, stated “This is one debate the discipline has missed the boat on....
At best, political science data on the matter is scarce, outdated, and inconclusive”
(Panagopoulos 2003). There have been a variety of studies about the impact of
nonpartisan ballots on municipal elections and the impact of different forms of
municipal government structures (Alford and Lee 1968, Bridges 1997, Caren 2007, S.
P. Hays 1964, Hajnal and Lewis 2003, Karnig and Walter 1983, Lee 1960, Schaffner,
Streb and Wright 2001, Welch and Bledsoe 1986, C. Wood 2002). To date, there have
been comparative quantitative analyses between comparable municipalities but there
has not been an empirical test of the effect of these municipal structures on voter
participation within an entire state. This paper seeks to address Panagopoulos’ point
by utilizing the necessary, recent, and relevant data towards a more conclusive end.
The issue of voter participation is one which ties together threads throughout our
history as a democracy, from our country’s founding, through the evolution of our
government, up to our current political system. The United States did not realize full
voter suffrage until the ratification of the 19th amendment in 1920 granting women the
2

right to vote. Currently, voting rights is a subject being disputed and decided in
municipalities, states, and even the Supreme Court. As will be examined in this study,
parties and government structures impact voter participation. Voter participation is a
crucial component of representation, a keystone of our conception of democracy.
From the inception of this experiment in democracy, the founders were wary of
political parties. In his farewell address, George Washington warned against political
parties casting them as potential impediments to the efficacy and permanency of the
country as a whole. The fear was that if the populace segregated itself into factions or
parties, this division would lead to instability and potentially the demise of the entire
union. In Federalist 10, James Madison acknowledged the tendency for man to fall
into factions or groups of interest. With this recognition of human behavior, he
decided not to support prohibition of the inevitable but to create a series of mediating
forces, ultimately through federalism, to impede the negative effects of such groups. In
so doing, however, the structures and impediments the founders put in place ultimately
set the course for modern political parties (Aldrich 1995). E. E. Schattschneider keenly
notes that the founders clearly did not anticipate the real prospect of political parties,
as we know them, as evidenced by “the provision in the original Constitution that the
House choose a president from five candidates receiving the highest electoral vote”
(Schattschneider 2009, 51). Similar distaste and mistrust of political parties, albeit due
to real not theoretical concerns, was a driving force by reformers in the Progressive
Era.
Another aspect of representation which was present amongst the founders and
reformers is an elitist view of who exactly should govern. Both felt that the well3

educated should represent the rest of the population. As will be discussed in a later
section, reformers in the Progressive Era implemented mediating forces, or structures,
in an effort to bring about that outcome.
In the following sections, I will present the historical context of the Progressive Era,
including how and why reformers were spurred to action and the actions they took,
specifically in municipal reform. The introduction of nonpartisan ballots, the CouncilManager form of government, and other municipal reforms will be discussed. This is
followed by an assessment of the implications and consequences of these reforms. A
review of the extant literature on participation will lay the groundwork for the data and
methods used to test the stated hypotheses. After the finding and results of the
analyses are presented, the paper will close with a discussion of said findings and their
implications and relevance.
WHY RHODE ISLAND?
As a graduate student at the University of Rhode Island, primarily interested in
American politics at the state and local levels, Rhode Island was an obvious choice to
study. But there are other reasons which inspired my selection. One was my
experience living in Newport while pursuing my degree. Another was the size of the
state and its 39 cities and towns. While there have been studies evaluating the
relationship between non-partisan elections and participation, there has not been one
which studies an entire state in this manner. Accordingly, the relative scale of data
collection was manageable. Thankfully, Rhode Island’s Secretary of State provides
easily accessible elections results. Additionally, there was a large enough sample of

4

non-partisan municipalities for statistical analysis. Twenty-three percent of the state’s
municipalities elect their local officials without party designation on the ballot.

5

HISTORICAL SETTING: Progressive Era
If one took but a cursory review of the Progressive Era, perhaps in textbooks or online,
one would read about good government reformers working in the public interest and
against corruption (Buhle, et al., 2000, Glencoe McGraw-Hill, 2009). While this
assessment is not necessarily incorrect, it is hardly the whole story (Judd and
Swanstrom 2004, p. 75). The Progressive Era, or the Progressive Movement, came
about in response to the growing pains of a young nation which was in the midst of
rapid industrial and population expansion (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Schiesl 1977).
This paper focuses on local and municipal elections, whose present day structures
were in large part constructed during the Progressive Era. To understand current forms
of government and elections, I will first review how these reforms. The following
section reviews the history of the Progressive Era, focusing primarily on changes to
local governance, and sets the stage for present day municipal government and
elections.
The Progressive Era took place roughly between 1880 and 1930 (Hofstadte, 1955,
Morgan, et al., 2007, Welch and Bledsoe 1988). At the national and federal level,
there were calls for reform of industry and for protection of workers. Charles Beard, a
prominent scholar and pro-reform advocate, described the Progressive Era by saying,
“The country was then in the midst of a periodic depression. Strikes and unrest were
abroad in the land. By leaps and bounds cities had been growing in population, wealth,
poverty, slums and degradation. During the preceding years scandals and frauds in
national, state and local government had been unearthed in shocking forms” (National
Civic League 2009). As a result, there was a populist thread to the national
6

Progressive Movement which called for a more equal playing field between businesses
and workers as well as for civil service reforms which would make government
employment more merit based. Leagues and associations sprung up to tackle such
issues, including the Civil Service Reform Association and the Massachusetts Reform
Club.

7

THE PROGRESIVE MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTY MACHINES
The changes in population and the influx of immigrants experienced during the late
1800s were felt acutely in the cities and urban areas. In the 1880s New York City’s
population increased by 75 percent from 171,750 to 3 million, Philadelphia’s
population topped one million, and Midwestern cities such as Cleveland and Chicago
doubled their populations (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Schiesl 1977, Wood 1958, p.
34). These surges in population left cities with more people than they were prepared to
manage: in short, populations soared faster than city planners could plan for them. The
lack of infrastructure and systems for delivering services by the local government left
a vacuum which was eagerly, and sometimes effectively, filled by local partisans.
Seizing the opportunity, the local parties grew and took advantage of their position in
the community (Hofstadter 1955). According to Welch and Bledsoe (1988, p.2), “the
turn-of-the-century political machines were led and backed by members of the lower
class and the working class, most of whom were of immigrant background.” Leading
the machines were the party bosses who used a system of patronage and wielded
power over many jobs in city government. Tammany Hall and Boss Tweed are
infamous examples of the party machine and ward boss systems (Riordan and Quinn
1995). The system of “spoils,”1 while serving some benefit to their communities, was
not without its significant downsides. Corruption, waste, and a lack of improvement in
living conditions were hallmarks of these parties.

Spoils, in this context, can be defined to mean “booty, loot, or plunder taken in war or robbery,” or
“the emoluments and advantages of public office viewed as won by a victorious political party: the
spoils of office.” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spoils
1
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The old guards of the cities, the Brahman and Anglo-Protestant classes, were unnerved
by these rapid changes in their communities. Specifically, they were alarmed by their
loss of political power to the machines and party bosses. While they were aware of the
need of administrative structures to handle the needs of the community, they were
keenly aware of the potential for loss of status and command. The main stated goal of
reform was to eliminate corruption, waste, and inefficiency (Banfield and Wilson
1963, p. 138, Morgan, et al., 2007, p. 63), which reformers saw manifested in corrupt
party officials and partisan patronage. The main source of such excess was the party
machine and it thereby became the direct target of the reformers’ ire.

9

REFORMERS
The tumultuous situations in the growing urban areas eventually became untenable for
many and calls for reform of the municipal system increased. Many of those who went
on to be reformers hailed from the middle and upper class, who had previously held
power in local government (Frederickson, Johnson and Wood 2004, 36). Melvin G.
Holli identified two main types of reformers, social and structural (Hawley 1973,
Welch and Bledsoe 1988). While both were distressed by the state of affairs, social
reformers were also interested in the well-being of the less fortunate and the overall
welfare of the general populace. Structural reformers were more concerned with
returning their cities to a pre-immigrant era and the associated benefits like lower
taxes (Morgan, England and Pelissero 2007, 64).
Municipal reformers were united by the belief that the political machines were the
primary root of the present day evils. A logical antithesis of corruption and waste is
efficiency. Early on in the reform movement, efficiency was synonymous with good
government (Judd and Swanstrom 2004). The drive for efficiency was tied to a desire
to lower the cost of running a city, including lowering taxes. Therefore the more
efficient a government, the better it was. In the same vein, reformers argued that a
municipality was a corporation, as opposed to a political entity, with citizens as
shareholders. A new system or structure of governance was sought to take the politics
and waste out of city government (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Schiesl 1977). The
practicality and efficiency of a business model was a hallmark of the reformers
argument (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Hays 1964, Holli 1974, Judd and Swanstrom
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2004, Link 1959, McCormick 1981, Morgan, et al., 2007, Schiesl 1977, Weinstein
1962, Welch and Bledsoe 1988).
Another important component of the reformers position was their ideology, which
included a firm belief in their purpose because it was good and moral. Righteously
sure, reformers declared their new structure of municipal government to be “more
moral, more rational, and more efficient and, because it was so, self-evidently more
desirable” (Hays 1964, p. 157). Elitism was included in this moral superiority,
stemming from discord and discomfort between the WASP reformers and growing
immigrant population. A natural next step from this combination of ideological zeal,
elitism, and business principles, was the “pervasive belief that certain citizens –
professionals, experts, and the well-educated – were more fit to govern than others”
(Hawley 1973, 9).
Municipal leagues sprung up in cities and states to tackle the municipal problems of
the day (Holli 1974, Tolman and Parkhurst 1895). The National Municipal League,
which was founded in 1894, was “primarily concerned with structural, not social,
reform, promoted ‘good government’ practices of various kinds and provided a
network for local reform groups” (Welch and Bledsoe 1988). Membership in the
League was largely made up of local businessmen and upper-middle class
professionals (Hawley 1973, Link 1959, Schiesl 1977). These businessmen and
members of the upper and middle class understood the opportunities available to them
in reforming the local government. It was logical for them to support good
government reforms which would increase access of government services and benefit
their personal financial interests (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Hays 1964, Link 1959).
11

MUNICIPAL REFORM
At the local level, reforms were promoted to make government more efficient, more
accessible and more representative. Richard Childs, thought of as the founder of
council-manager government, conceived of and convincingly argued for the new
government structure. His plan was “patterned after a business model of an
organization” (East 1965, p. 36). Eventually, “progressivism, scientific management
and public administration had accepted the model of the private business corporation
as the form most likely to produce that prized commodity, efficiency” (East 1965, p.
74). Childs’ work was and still is used by organizations promoting municipal reform.
In the late 1890s, the National Municipal League was founded to advocate for
municipal reform and is still in operation today as the National Civic League. In 1898,
the League adopted its first Municipal Plan which included a provision known as a
“home rule charter” to “give more power and autonomy to local officials, a unicameral
city council with nonpartisan elections, and a hands-on managerial mayor to appoint
and remove department heads” (McGrath 2011). In 2003, the League published its
eighth edition of the Model City Charter and continues to promote many of the same
reforms and platforms as earlier editions, including nonpartisan elections.
James Bryce, and his 1888 The American Commonwealth, laid the groundwork for the
structural reform that would take place over the following decades (Holli 1974).
Bryce’s outline discusses corrupt officials, problems with local partisanship, the
intervention of state government in local affairs, and “mechanical defects” in the
structure of local government. Banfield and Wilson argue that the “program of
reform” is best viewed in four categories or objectives. These objectives include: 1.
12

“putting the electorate in the position to assert its will despite professional politicians,”
which encompasses the initiative, recall and referendum; 2. “simplifying the voter’s
task” with the use of a short ballot and information provided by municipal
associations; 3. “checking the tide of immigration,” which speaks to the contrast
between the demographics of the reformers and immigrant populations; 4. “separating
the ‘business’ of city government from state and national politics” by implementing
home rule, nonpartisanship, and timing local elections apart from state and national
ones (Banfield and Wilson 1963, 140-141).
To the reformers, party machines and bosses were the embodiment of the problem
belying the cities (Bridges 1997). Thus, the focus of reform originated with removing
the parties from power. Call for nonpartisanship began as early as 1881 (Hawley 1973,
Holl, 1974, Lee 1960, Morgan, et al., 2007, Schies, 1977, Welch and Bledsoe 1988).
By removing the partisan influence, the reformers could remove the bad actors and
make room for those who they saw as more fit to govern.
To tackle corrupt officials, reformers were in favor of merit based placement for
government jobs. This was part of civil service reform which was a concurrent
movement at both the local and national levels. The removal of party loyalty and
patronage blended well with the argument for merit based placement in the
government (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Holli 1974). In response to the relationship
between the state legislature and municipal government, Home Rule set the legal basis
for local autonomy for a city or municipality within its home state (Vanlandingham
1968, 270). To remedy the perceived decline in representation of the reformers in local
government, at-large elections were endorsed over ward elections (Banfield and
13

Wilson 1963, Hays 1967, Judd and Swanstrom 2004, Morgan, et al., 2007, Welch and
Bledsoe 1988). Armed with these and other prescriptions for taking the politics out of
local government, the National Municipal League published its first Model City
Charter in 1899 (Gates and Loper 2003).
Charter revision was already underway in Galveston, TX by 1899. Four years earlier,
a Good Government club had been formed by local businessmen. In 1900, the
opportunity for a new form of government presented itself when a devastating
hurricane and tidal wave all but destroyed the city (National Civic League 2009,
Schiesl 1977). Unable to properly supervise the resulting circumstance, the sitting
council resigned and a commission of, primarily, businessmen took up the mantle of
governing the city. After some legal fine-tuning with the state legislature, a legitimate
Commission plan was officially in place. Part of the appeal was that a city could
function as an administrative entity without conflict of interest (Schiesl 1977, 136).
The new system of government spread quickly, gaining notoriety as the Des Moines
Plan in 1907, and was implemented in 300 cities by 1913 (Weinstein 1962, 169).
Unfortunately, the Des Moines Plan proved problematic in practice. The main issue
was the combination of legislative and executive functions into one body. Efficiency
suffered (Schiesl 1977, 146). Another result of the commission form of government
was the increasing presence of businessmen and business interests (Schiesl 1977,
Weinstein 1962). The consequence of this was policies which favored middle and
upper class values (Judd and Swanstrom 2004, Schiesl 1977, Welch and Bledsoe
1988).
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Opportunely, Richard S. Childs and the National Municipal League were equipped
with a solution. Their answer was a new form of government which remedied the
problem of commission government by placing a city manager at the helm of the
administrative needs of the council. Staunton, Virginia was the first locale to hire a
city manager in 1908. However, Sumter, South Carolina was the first city to adopt the
full platform in 1912. The full platform required alteration to the city charter. Staunton
adopted it in 1920 (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Schiesl 1977). Dayton, Ohio followed
suit in 1913 and ten years later the system was in pace in 270 cities. As of 2006, the
International City/County Management Association states this to be the most common
form of government with 55 percent of American municipalities using it (National
Civic League 2009, National League of Cities 2013).

15

REFORM CITIES: Implementation and Effects
The most common implementation of the city manager platform, or Council-Manager
form of government, involves charter reform which was codified in the National
Municipal League’s second edition of the Model City Charter in 1915. The most
recent version, the Eighth Edition, was released in 2003. Presently, municipal
government is described as being reform or non-form, or administrative or political.
Reform, or administrative, municipalities often include the council-manager form of
government, nonpartisan elections, and at-large elections. Non-reform or political
governments consist of a strong, directly elected mayor, partisan elections, and ward
elections (Frederickson, et al., 2004, Morgan, et al., 2007).
Clearly, the primary goals of the reformers were to end corruption in municipal
government. However, the normative goals also included making the government
more accessible and responsible “to the people.” Reformers viewed machines as
barriers to participation because of national and state influence on local elections,
patronage, and generally corruption elections (Banfield and Wilson 1963, Hawley
1973, Lee 1960, Wood 1958). Therefore, removing these barriers, it would be easier
for citizens to become informed and make rational electoral decisions. By making
these informed and rational decisions, they would see the fruit of their labor and
political and civic engagement would take hold (Gates 1999, Keller 2002, McGrath
2011, National Civic Review 1994). Instead, the reformers removed one set of barriers
only to put others in place. In this next section, I will review the extant literature on
the effects of nonpartisanship, council-manager structure, and at-large elections on
voter participation. The important point here is that while most political scientists
16

believe that high levels of participation are required in order for there to be responsive
executives and legislatures (Lijphart 1997, S. M. Lipset 1963, Lipset and Schneider
1983), the evidence is that these reforms produced the opposite results.
The A-Political Government
Research on nonpartisan elections and turnout suggests that municipal reform
depresses civic participation. To better understand the relationship between voters and
participation, it is helpful and important to review the existing scholarship on the
subject. The most basic and common way to explain why people do, or do not vote is
through what was originally presented by Anthony Downs in 1957 as the “calculus of
voting.” This calculus provides a simple cost/benefit analysis of the rationale people
use for going to the polls. The basic equation states that the reward the voter receives
from the act of voting is equal to a combination of both how much the voter prefers
one candidate over another and the probability that candidate will win, minus the costs
to the voter for this act. The costs involved include time and information which can be
quite high. Based on this formula, the costs usually seem to outweigh the benefits for
“rational” people. Thus, voting turnout can be understood to be low. Other scholars
have sought to enhance the calculus by adding other factors which better represent the
human and social qualities involved in the act of participation, such as benefits which
include a sense of fulfillment from exercising a civic duty (Riker and Ordeshook
1968). The significance of the calculus of voting here is that costs associated with
voting, including the time is takes to register as well as the time and effort it takes to
become informed on the issues and candidates and the time it takes to get to the
polling place, can easily be too high for people to overcome.
17

Efforts to increase voter turnout and participation invariably include ways which aim
to decrease the costs of voting. For example easing the registration process either by
allowing people to register the same day as they vote or allowing people to vote by
mail have been shown to do just that (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Highton 2004,
Hill 2006). Another method voters use to decrease the transaction costs associated
with voting is by employing “information shortcuts.” People use information shortcuts
every day in their decision-making processes. It is costly to spend time gathering all
the available information about any given decision, whether it be which car to
purchase or which candidate to favor. Information shortcuts are informed by a variety
of sources including friends and neighbors, the media, and opinion leaders (Popkin
1995). One particularly important shortcut, or heuristic, is political party. While
political parties at the state and local levels can vary from the national parties on some
messages and platforms, party labels can quickly help a voter decipher information
about candidates (Conover and Feldman 1989). Party preference is likewise influenced
by friends and neighbors, the media, and opinion leaders in addition to past events and
current facts about a campaign or candidate (Popkin 1995).
One of the arguments for reform was that by equalizing the ballot, by removing
partisan labels, voters would take it upon themselves to become more informed in
their decisions. What has been shown to happen, though, is that by removing this
information shortcut the costs associated with voting increase. This increase in cost
causes some voters to disengage and thereby lowers voter turnout and participation.
Charles Adrian was one of the first to assess and critique the impact of nonpartisan
municipal elections and point to this unfortunate consequence.
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Adrian begins his 1952 paper by describing the context within which the reformers
made their case for “a series of innovations designed to place government ‘on a
business basis’ and to weaken the power of the political parties” (Adrian 1952, p.
766). He describes eleven characteristics 2 which he saw as the negative consequences
and outcomes from the implementation of the specific reform of nonpartisan ballots
and elections. Ultimately, he presents consequences which undermine some of the
arguments reformers made in advocating such amendments. For example, rather than
producing a more informed and energized citizenry which chooses the most qualified
leaders for their community, Adrian points to the proliferation of incumbents and the
lack of accountability for the elected officials.
Adrian (1959) also categorized a typology including four generalized municipalities
which vary by presence and/or strength of political parties and other groups in the
community, either politically affiliated or not. Some communities have no semblance
of political parties in their communities, whereas other communities have other groups
which operate in very similar ways to parties but do not have a political label, per se.
Specifically, Type I includes elections where candidates with the best chance of
election are those which have partisan backing, despite the lack of party affiliation on
the ballot. Type II includes elections where slating groups, partisan and nonpartisan,

2

The eleven characteristics are: 1. Nonpartisanship serves to weaken the political parties in those areas
where it is in effect; 2. Segregation of political leaders strictly to either partisan or nonpartisan areas is
the general rule; 3. Channels for recruitment of candidates for partisan offices are restricted by
nonpartisanship; 4. Channels for recruitment of candidates for nonpartisan offices are restricted by
nonpartisanship; 5. Limited new channels for recruitment of candidates for nonpartisan offices are
opened by nonpartisanship; 6. Segregation of funds for financing nonpartisan and partisan election
campaigns is nearly complete; 7. Facilities for fund-raising by candidates for nonpartisan offices are
restricted by nonpartisanship; 8. Nonpartisanship encourages the avoidance of issues of policy in
campaigns; 9. Nonpartisanship tends to frustrate protest voting; 10. Nonpartisanship produces a
legislative body with a relatively high percentage of experienced members, making for conservatism;
11. There is no collective responsibility in a nonpartisan body.
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support various candidates. Type III includes elections where various slating groups
support candidates, but there is little party involvement. Type IV includes elections
where neither slating groups nor parties are active in campaigns, and if they are it is
only sporadically. This study illustrates some of the ways communities and their
leaders adapted to the structural absence of party labels. Adrian concludes by writing,
“with a few exceptions, nonpartisan elections have accomplished what they were
originally designed to do; they have effectively removed regular political machinery
from involvement in certain kinds of local, judicial and state elections” (Adrian 1959,
p. 458).
Pomper (1966) studied the effect of other groups in nonpartisan municipal elections in
Newark, New Jersey. The author surmises that Newark fits into Adrian’s third type of
nonpartisan election. He found that where there are other groups – either religious or
ethnic or racial – to be organized along such cleavages, they can and will do so. What
is striking about this study, as well as some others from that time period, is that it
speaks to the social aspect in communities as well as to the history and formation of
parties in the U.S. (Freeman 1958, Salisbury and Black 1963, Hagensick 1964). The
United States was conceived without parties, but they emerged out of necessity and
out of the social beings that operated the government (Aldrich 1995). On one hand,
this is a hydra-like problem for the reformers. By cutting off the name of the
organizations or parties, people moved to organize in a similar way. On the other
hand, once the organization and structure of parties or like-groups is gone it is hard to
reconstruct (Karnig and Walter 1983, p. 503).
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In his research on California city elections, Lee (1960) discusses the decrease in voter
turnout in local elections from general elections. While his findings do support the
consensus that local elections draw fewer voters to the polls, his findings do not point
directly to nonpartisan ballots as the culprit. Karnig and Walter, however, found that
both nonpartisan ballots and city-manager structures impede voter turnout (Karnig and
Walter 1983). Supporting Adrian and Pomper’s findings, Squire and Smith show that
nonpartisan elections can easily be viewed as partisan or partisan-like in the minds of
the electorate based on the information available to them (Squire and Smith 1988).
More recently, Schaffner, Streb and White (2001) present further evidence that
nonpartisan elections depress voter turnout and that voters use information based on
incumbency rather than party, thus furthering incumbents careers.
The Council-Manager Government
The literature on the structure of local governments, namely the form of government,
indicates that those with reform governments have lower voter participation in the
form of voter turnout. The following section reviews the findings from relevant
scholarship.
In their 1968 article, Robert Alford and Eugene Lee examined turnout in American
cities looking at the categories of “political structure, social structure, and community
continuity” (Alford and Lee 1968, 800). Of interest for this study is their focus on
political structure, namely form of government. The authors also included ballot type,
partisan versus nonpartisan, in their calculation of structure. They found that reformed
governments, those with the council-manager form of government and nonpartisan
ballots, have lower voter turnout than those without reformed strcutures (Alford and
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Lee 1968, 802). In attempting to assess the independent impact of form of government
on turnout, the authors found it to be more significantly correlated with turnout than
ballot type (partisan or nonpartisan) (Alford and Lee 1968, 805).
As referenced above, Karnig and Walter examined the impact of structure on
municipal turnout and found reformed governments, with city-manager forms and
nonpartisan elections, to have lower turnout than non-reformed governments (Karnig
and Walter 1983). The authors looked specifically at these two components of reform,
city-manager and nonpartisan ballots, and used cross-sectional and longitudinal
analysis of elections from the 1930s, 1960s, and 1970s. Across these three time
frames, the analysis shows council-manager governments lagging in turnout by about
10 percent, as compared to commission and mayor-council forms (Karnig and Walter
1983, 497).
In 1997, Amy Bridges expanded the scope of study on the effects of progressive
reforms by moving beyond the geographical areas previously studied. While some
literature included analysis of region and geography, the south-western United States
had not been extensively evaluated (Alford and Lee 1968, Karnig and Walter 1983,
Lineberry and Fowler 1967). Bridges reviewed reform structures in seven southwest
cities which implemented reform in the 1950s, comparing them to what she described
as “machine descendent” cities from the Northeast and Midwest (Bridges 1997). Her
findings show significant differences between municipal turnout with reform cities
having roughly 20 percent average turnout and machine descendants having between
43.6 percent and 57.3 percent (Bridges 1997, 101).
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Concerned with a broader conception of voter participation, J. Eric Oliver studied the
state of democracy in suburban areas (Oliver 2001). The author compared civic
participation levels, including contacting local officials, attending community board
meetings, participating in voluntary organizations, working informally with neighbors,
and voting between reform and non-reform municipal governments. The only civic
participation which was significantly different was voting, with non-reform
governments showing a higher rate of participation (Oliver 2001, 183).
Curtis Wood’s examination of turnout in city elections also supports the argument that
form of government impacts turnout (C. Wood 2002). Using a random sample of 57
cities, the author categorized cities based on their political or administrative structure.
Wood employed five categories for structure, taking into account the varying types of
government which have evolved over time. These categories include political, adapted
political, conciliated, adapted administrative, and administrative. Controlling for
socioeconomic factors and the timing of elections, Wood found that cities with more
political structures, i.e. mayor-council and partisan ballots, have higher voter turnout
than cities with more administrative structures, i.e. council-manager and nonpartisan
ballots.
Seeking further insight into voter turnout and municipal structures and potential
remedies to lower participation rates, Hajnal and Lewis examined cities in California.
While their key recommendation for tangible results to increase voter participation in
municipal elections is to have local elections coincide with state and national
elections, their findings provide more support for the argument that structure matters.
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Specifically, they found that council-manager government structures dampen turnout
(Hajnal and Lewis 2003, 658).
Neal Caren sought to explain the variation in municipal turnout in cities by examining
mayoral contests. Studying election data from 332 elections in 38 large U.S. cities
over a 35 year period, the author employed a GLS random effects model and found
more evidence to support the argument that the council-manager form of government
is linked to lower turnout. Specifically, “cities with council managers have a turnout
7.5 percentage points lower than cities with strong mayors” (Caren 2007, 41). In
another model in the same study, the author looked at the interaction between the
mayoral margin of victory and the form of government and found that even in
competitive elections, there was lower turnout in cities with the council-manager form
of government.
Electoral Systems
Another component of reform government is at-large or city-wide election of city
councilors. Banfield and Wilson categorize the arrangements and procedures by which
city officials are elected, at-large or district, as electoral systems (Banfield and Wilson
1963, 87). While the bulk of the literature on the topic focuses on representation as
opposed to turnout, it is important to understand the reformers’ arguments for this
structural change and the potential effects of this reform. The following section will
review the evolution of the electoral systems from district, or ward, to at-large and the
scholarship on the effects.
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Wards, or electoral districts within a city or municipality, were synonymous with the
party boss and thus with corruption, graft, and greed in the same way partisanship was
(Bridges 1997, Welch and Bledsoe 1988). Wards were also seen as bastions of the
poor and immigrants classes which found representation through the ward system. So,
it is not surprising that reformers moved to eliminate them soon after they argued for
nonpartisanship. The reformers saw multiple reasons for moving to city-wide
elections. It would weaken the power of the machine boss while encouraging those
who ran to seek approval of the entire city. Like-wise, the reformers hoped this new
method would produce the desired outcome of the election of “better people” (Judd
and Swanstrom 2004, Morgan, England and Pelissero 2007, Welch and Bledsoe
1988).
The impact of the elimination of district electoral systems was clear, and in some
places almost immediate. After the 1895 city council elections in Galveston, TX, the
three African-American councilors lost their seats in the city-wide contest (Bridges
1997, 74). Welch and Bledsoe found that at-large contests result in the election of
better educated and wealthier councilors than those in district elections, holding other
variables constant (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, 42). In sum, the move from district to atlarge elections appears to affect who is elected and tends to disadvantage minority
populations.
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IMPORT OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The literature review up to this point has included discussion of political parties with
regard to their presence or absence in local elections. The following section will
review scholarship on the importance and utility of parties, both generally in American
politics as well as specifically as they pertain to state and local political activity.
Various scholars have cited the importance of political parties. The import and value
they see ranges from the state and local to the federal and even to the normative
underpinnings of how the American political system developed and functions. E. E.
Schattschneider wrote in 1942 that, “the rise of political parties is undoubtedly one of
the principal distinguishing marks of modern government...political parties created
modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties”
(Schattschneider 2009, 1). V. O. Key shows support for this view when he wrote that
“political parties perform functions essential to the operation of a democratic order”
(Key 1958, 311). Sarah McCally Morehouse makes a strong case for parties at the
state level asserting that “the single most important factor in state politics is the
political party. It is not possible to understand the differences in the way sovereign
states carry out the process of government without understanding the type of party
whose representatives are making decisions that affect the health, education, and
welfare of its citizens” (Morehouse 1981, 29).
One way political parties demonstrate their utility is by solving the collect action
problem. Collective action is the organized and planned behavior of and by individuals
and groups. The problem of collective action occurs when individuals and groups
work only in their self-interest and not with those who are like-minded. This can result
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in the least optimal results for those involved. Aldrich provides an excellent example
of a collective action problem which highlights the incentives for party formation. In
his example, there are three legislators in a unicameral legislature encountering three
bills which would provide distributive benefits. The benefits for any given bill would
serve some districts more than others but cost all involved. Assuming each legislator is
acting rationally, Legislator A would favor Bill X which most benefits his district,
Legislator B would favor Bill Z which most benefits his district, and Legislator C
would favor Bill Y most benefits his district. If each bill passes by a 2-1 vote, the total
benefit or payoff to each legislator is negative. This is the least optimal outcome but
one that is likely if the legislators act independently. The least optimal outcome is
avoided and the problem of collective action is overcome when Legislators A and B
agree to work together and vote only for Bill X. This rudimentary scenario shows the
incentives for party formation.
Table 1. A Collective Action Problem and Incentive for Party Formation 3

This problem of collective action is manifested in the electorate when voters act as
individuals with their own self-interest. For example, say there are three candidates
3

This table and example were adapted from Aldrich (1995, 30)
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representing three diverse opinions on a salient issue. One supports eliminating roads
altogether, one supports building new roads while neglecting those which are in need
of repair, and a one supports fixing the roads in need of repair. Functional roads are a
public good and one from which everyone benefits. If voters in this election are split
between the candidate who wants to repair the existing roads and the candidate who
wants to build new roads, the candidate who wants to abandon roads altogether could
win; resulting in the least optimal outcome. Parties overcome this problem by
aggregating the choices available so that the majority preference can win. Voter
turnout is the “quintessential example” of the collective action problem with regard to
the logic of voting (Aldrich 1995, 46). As Schattschneider stated, “Other things being
equal, any unorganized group will exhibit a tendency toward dispersion of its voting
strength which can only be overcome by planning, consultation, and organization”
(Schattschneider 2009, 41-42).
Parties help solve the collective action problem through such planning, consultation,
and organization. As discussed above, the calculus of voting indicates that an
individual’s perception of making a difference by voting can be low. Aldrich adds that
the calculus of voting is preceded by a collective action problem of being informed
(Aldrich 1995, 47). Parties work to decrease the cost of voting by informing voters
about the issue, particularly the importance of the outcome. Parties also work to
mobilize the electorate by aggregating similar preferences amongst voters (Huckfeldt
and Sprague 1992, 70). Lipset (2000, 48) stresses the importance of institutionalized
party competition and therefore political parties through their role of “a social
mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence
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major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office” thereby solving
the collective action problem.
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DATA AND HYPOTHESES
Based on the extant literature regarding voter participation in municipalities with
reform governments and nonpartisan ballots, two hypotheses will be tested in this
paper.
H1: Municipalities with partisan ballots will have higher voter participation
than those with no party identification.
H2: Municipalities with Mayor-Council forms of government will have higher
voter participation than those with other forms of government such as CouncilManager, Administrator-Council, and Council.
The data for this study measures voter registration and turnout from municipal
elections between 2003 and 2012 in Rhode Island’s 39 municipalities. There are five
observations, or elections, for each municipality where available. There are only two
observations for Providence because they hold their municipal elections every four
years. There are only four observations for Central Falls because they did not hold
elections in 20114. Due to the timing of some municipal elections, namely odd-year
elections, the time span includes 2003 through 2012. By including multiple
observations, it is possible to control for temporary spikes and dips in
registration/turnout. It also guards against potential factors which might influence
voter participation. A single observation might be constrained by other variables not
measured in the study. And as previously mentioned, there are significant differences
in voter participation in general and midterm elections. The data was compiled from

4

The City of Central Falls went into receivership in May 2011 and filed for bankruptcy in August 2011.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-rhodeisland-centralfalls-idUSTRE7703ID20110801
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the Rhode Island Secretary of State, as well as individual municipal canvass or clerks’
offices by the author.
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VARIABLES
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variable of interest is voter participation. Voter participation is
measured using two variables, voter turnout and voter registration. Voter registration
(e.g. percent registered) is calculated as the number of individuals registered to vote
over the total population of residents age 18 and over, for each municipality. This
value represents those who are technically old enough to vote in each election. Voter
age population (VAP) was chosen instead of voter eligible population (VEP)5 because
information on voter eligibility by city was not available whereas basic population was
available from the U.S. Census. VEP is more precise and includes an estimate of those
within the population who are actually eligible to vote. For example, VEP takes into
account non-citizens, felons, and other legally excluded sections of the population.
While VEP may offer a more precise count, VAP was chosen because VEP is
unfortunately unavailable. While VEP would be preferable, using VAP biases the
models away from getting support for my hypotheses and therefore is acceptable.
Population data, including total population and population over the age 18, is from the
2000 and 2010 U.S. Census counts. U.S. Census data from the 2000 count was used
for observations which occurred in the years 2003 through 2005. For observations
which occurred in the years 2006 through 2012, U.S. Census population data from the
2010 count was employed. These two Census counts were used in an attempt to have a
more accurate population count based on the timing of the observations.

For more information on VAP and VEP, visit Dr. Michael McDonald’s website on this topic,
http://elections.gmu.edu/FAQ.html
5
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Voter turnout is derived by dividing the number of individuals who did turn out to
vote by the number of individuals who were registered to vote, for each municipality.
Both turnout and registration data was obtained from the city or town clerk of the
municipality’s canvass office.
One issue with the data worth noting pertains to all observations for the town of New
Shoreham. Using the above described method to derive voter registration, the resulting
figures are more than one. This would mean there is more than 100% voter
registration, which is not possible. There are three plausible potential explanations for
this outcome. One is that the town officials have not cleaned their voter rolls, meaning
they have old and inaccurate data. Another possibility is that the U.S. Census count for
the town is not as current as the voter registration counts. For example, population
data for the observation occurring in 2004 used U.S. Census data from the year 2000.
Subsequent observations use population data from the 2010 U.S. Census. The third
plausible reason is likely a combination of the two possible explanations just
described. There is probably old and inaccurate data on the voter rolls in New
Shoreham and there may be issues with the accurate population counts for the town.
The data for New Shoreham was included in the models.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
There are two primary independent variables of interest to this study. The first is a
categorical variable which is defined by the presence or absent of party label on
municipal ballots. This is a naturalistic observational study where the groups,
nonpartisan and partisan, have already been assigned. Data on ballot type, partisan or
nonpartisan, for each municipality was gathered from the Rhode Island Secretary of
33

State, as well as individual municipal canvass or clerks’ offices. In the data, partisan
cities are coded as 1, and nonpartisan as 0.
The second independent variable of interest is the form of government. There are four
forms of municipal government in Rhode Island: Mayor-Council, Council-Manager,
Administrator-Council, and Council (Rhode Island Department of Revenue Revised
2013). Mayor-council governments are also referred to as political, as opposed to
Commission or Council-Manager which are referred to as reform (Judd and
Swanstrom 2004). Mayor-Council governments typically have directly elected
executive and partisan elections. They also typically have ward elections as opposed to
at-large, however there are a number of municipalities in Rhode Island which have a
hybrid or both ward and at-large elections6. Council-Manager governments indirectly
choose their executive, or manager, through the elected city council. They also tend to
include other reforms measures such as elections separated from state and national
elections, in addition to nonpartisan ballots and at-large elections. Rhode Island’s
Administrator-Council governments are similar to Council-Manager in that they do
not have a directly elected executive and may have nonpartisan ballots. Commission
and Council governments have no specific executive and tend to incorporate reform
measures. In Rhode Island, there are 16 municipalities with Council-Manager
governments, 10 with Administrator-Council governments, 8 with Mayor-Council
governments, and 5 with Council governments.
For this analysis, Council-Manager and Administrator-Council were combined into
one variable. Based on available information about the design and structure of the
6

Newport, RI is an example of a city employing hybrid ward and at-large elections. Of the seven city council seats,
four are elected at-large and three are elected from individual wards. http://www.cityofnewport.com/government
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cities and towns, these two forms of government are very similar. Since form of
government is not the sole focus of this study and the differences in form for this
setting are small, Council-Manager and Administrator-Council were combined into a
single form in the analysis of form of government. In the regression model, Council
form of government was dropped to serve as the comparison group for the other
forms. Data on the form of government for each municipality was gathered from the
Rhode Island Secretary of State, as well as individual municipal canvass or clerks’
offices.
In Amy Bridges’ assessments of municipal reform in the Southwest, she terms chosen
municipalities form the Northeast and Midwest as “machine descendants” (Bridges,
Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest 1997). While in theory the
municipalities which I am studying may fall into this categorization, I am reluctant to
state that they are due to a lack of specific empirical definitions. Bridges’ definition
states that “Machine descendants all had strong party organizations, substantial
patronage resources, and concurrent elections. Another difference between big-city
reform and the machine descendants is that all of the big-city reform cities had
citywide elections for the city council members and machine descendants had district
representation on the city council” (Bridges 1997, 131). Without specific criteria for
what constitutes strong party organizations or significant patronage resources or a
timeframe for when concurrent elections began or ceased, I cannot confirm that any of
the cities and towns in Rhode Island qualify.
The final variable employed and tested is one which combines the absence of party
label, or nonpartisanship, and presence of the Council-Manager and Administrator35

Council form of government. In the data, municipalities with both nonpartisan ballots
and the Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms of government are coded
1, and those which do not have this combination as 0. Alford and Lee (1968), Karnig
and Walter (1983), and Wood (2002) each included a similar variable in their analyses
and found mayor-council and partisan ballots, have higher voter turnout than cities
with council-manager and nonpartisan ballots.
Control Categorical Variables
There are a number of other control variables which are included in this analysis.
Because there are many factors which can influence voter participation, it is important
to include those which are relevant. Of course, all potentially influential variables
cannot and are not included; however, I have tried to control for the major known
predictors of voter turnout. Those which pertain to this study are discussed below.
Another variable which relates to the structural reforms discussed above, such as the
form of government, is the timing of elections. For the most part, municipal elections
in Rhode Island are held during even years, coinciding with national and state
elections in November. However, some are held during odd-years and/or during times
of year that are not generally associated with other elections. There is considerable
extant literature and historical evidence which shows voter participation is higher in
years with national, Presidential elections than those in which midterm, state-wide
elections occur (Burden 2000, Campbell 60, Conway 1981, Gilliam 1985, Shields &
Goidel 1997, Wolfinger, et al. 1981). Similarly, there is evidence which shows that
elections which take place during odd-years have lower turnout and participation than
those in midterm years (Hajnal & Lewis 2003, Wood 2002). To take into account the
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variation in timing, each municipal observation was coded to correspond with when
the election occurred and included General Election, Mid-Term Election, Odd-Year
Election, or Other Time (e.g. non-second Tuesday in November election). Information
on when each municipal election occurred was gathered from a few different sources.
For those elections which occurred in even years, both Presidential and mid-term
election years, the information was readily available online at the state Board of
Elections website. For those municipalities which held elections either during oddyears and/or at different times of year, the respective town clerk or canvass office was
contacted to verify when the election was held.
How competitive an election is may have an impact on turnout. The more interesting,
exciting or talked about an election is may compel those who might ordinarily sit out
an election to pay attention and cast a ballot. Similarly, if an election is perceived to be
close, the idea that one’s vote will matter increases (Conway 1981, Wood 2002,
Hajnal & Lewis 2003). To account for any potential influence from close or
competitive elections, a variable to represent electoral competition was derived and
employed. To capture overall electoral competition for each municipality in a given
election, the percent was taken using the number of challengers divided by the total
number of council seats. For example, if there were 5 seats on a council and 7
challengers for the open seats that election, the electoral competition value would be
7/5 or 1.4. An overall competition value was chosen as there is variance in the
construct of each municipality’s city or town council. In some, all councilors are
elected at-large, in others all are elected from wards, and others still have a mix of
ward and at-large representation. This competition value takes into account the
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number of seats, the number of challengers, and allows for there to be one value per
municipality for each observed election.
Socioeconomic and demographic factors are correlated with participation 7. It has been
clearly, significantly and robustly documented that “citizens with higher social and
economic status participate more in politics” (Conway, 1985, p. 125, Verba and Nie
1972, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). To ensure that demographic differences
across the municipalities were controlled, the following variables were included as
percents of the population: marital status, households with children under the age of
18, educational attainment (measured as having completed high school), educational
attainment with some college, race and ethnicity, foreign born, language other than
English, and median household income. Data for each municipality was obtained from
U.S. Census data from the official 2000 and 2010 counts and from existing and
requested documents from the Division of Planning in Rhode Island’s Department of
Administration (State of Rhode Island Division of Planning 2012). U.S. Census data
from the 2000 count was used for observations which occurred in the years 2003
through 2005. For observations which occurred in the years 2006 through 2012, U.S.
Census population data from the 2010 count was employed. These two Census counts
were used in an attempt to have a more accurate count based on the timing of the
observations.
The Division of Planning’s website provides spreadsheets containing municipal level
socioeconomic data on age, race, and ethnicity, using data from the 2010 U.S. Census
and the American Community Survey (ACS). A spreadsheet containing the median
7

For more on this topic, please see the literature review section on participation.
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household income for each municipality was sourced from the Census’ 2007-2011 5Year ACS. In order to get the social characteristics for each municipality, I requested
the data from the Division of Planning. It was provided and is sourced from the 20072011 5-Year ACS (Martin 2012). The data for social characteristics for observations
which occurred in the years 2003 through 2005 was obtained from the 2000 U.S.
Census report. The ACS data was used with social characteristics for observations
which occurred in the years 2005 through 2012. Each of these factors should be
associated with higher voter turnout.
Due to the variation across municipalities in size and demographics, percentages were
used to represent marital status, the number of households with children under age 18,
educational attainment, and race and ethnicity using the municipality’s population as
the denominator. Race and ethnicity included percentages of White, Black, Asian, and
other. Other was an aggregate of the remaining races and ethnicities provided by the
Census.
It is important to note that the ACS data comes from a survey and the values for each
municipality are estimates. These estimates can have varying margins of error,
depending on the data set. The margins of error can be larger for smaller geographic
areas. The relationship between socioeconomic and demographic variables and voter
participation is not the focus of this study yet they are important to take into account.
The ACS data was used because it is the best and most reliable available data.
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METHODOLOGY
A random effects generalized least squares regression with robust standard error
adjusted for clustering of municipalities over time was employed. A total of four
models are run. They include a registration model and a turnout model for ballot type
and form of government and a registration model and a turnout model for the
combined variable of nonpartisan ballot type and council-manager and administratorcouncil forms of government. All four models were run in STATA using xtreg and the
syntax code used for each is available in Appendix II.
The interclass correlation (rho) for the two turnout models are .14 and .23,
respectively. The interclass correlation (rho) for the two registration models are both
.93. The tables for each model are presented in the following results section.
Statistical Model
A total of four models are run. While the dependent variables change with each model,
the control variables in each include the percent estimated married, the percent of
households with children under the age of 18, the percent with educational attainment
through high school, the percent with educational attainment of some college, the
percent foreign born, the percent with a language other than English, median
household income, percent race white, percent race black, percent race other, percent
race other, the variable for electoral competition, the time of election in midterm
years, the time of election in off-years, and the time of election in other times with the
time of election in general elections held constant.
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FINDINGS
The following section reviews the findings and results. Bivariate analyses of the
hypotheses are discussed, followed by findings in the random effects generalized least
squares regressions.
Statewide Registration and Turnout
Figure 1.

Figure 1 shows the average registration and turnout statewide for each observation.
After a slight dip in the second observation period, registration appears to be
increasing slightly over time. Turnout appears to be higher in the first, third and fifth
observations, which corresponds to presidential election years. There is a slight drop
in turnout in the second observation and a marked decreased in turnout in the fourth
observation.
Partisanship
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Figure 2.

Figure 2 shows the comparison of average registration in municipalities with partisan
ballots to those with nonpartisan ballots. Average registration for partisan
municipalities over the five observations was 76.45%. The bivariate analysis in Figure
2 supports my hypothesis. Average registration is higher in partisan cities than in nonpartisan cities.

42

Figure 3.

Figure 3 shows the comparison of average turnout in municipalities with partisan
ballots to those with nonpartisan ballots. Average turnout for partisan municipalities
over the five observations was 61.88%. Average turnout for nonpartisan municipalities
over the five observations was 56.7%. Municipalities with partisan elections show a
higher rate of registration, 10.81%, and a higher rate of voter turnout, 5.18%. This is
consistent with the existing research comparing the two types of elections and
provides some support for the hypothesis that municipalities with partisan ballots will
have higher voter participation than those with no party identification. And again, the
bivariate relationships suggest support for my hypothesis.
Form of Government
Figure 4 shows the comparison of average registration in municipalities with CouncilManager and Administrator-Council, Mayor-Council, and Council forms of
government. Average registration for municipalities with Council-Manager and
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Administrator-Council over the five observations was 76.46%. Average turnout for
municipalities with Council-Manager and Administrator-Council over the five
observations was 61.54%.
Figure 4.

Average registration for municipalities with Mayor-Council governments over the five
observations was 62.21%. Average turnout for municipalities with Mayor-Council
governments over the five observations was 52.65%. This does not provide support for
the second hypothesis.
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Figure 5.

Figure 5 shows the comparison of average turnout in municipalities with CouncilManager and Administrator-Council, Mayor-Council, and Council forms of
government. Average registration for municipalities with Council governments over
the five observations was 77.82%. Average turnout for municipalities with Council
governments over the five observations was 67.76%.
Comparing the three forms of government shows Mayor-Council governments had the
lowest registration and turnout, which is counter to the existing literature on the
subject and to my hypothesis. On average, the Council form of government had the
highest rates of registration and turnout, with Council-Manager and AdministratorCouncil governments having registration and turnout rates between Mayor-Council
and Council forms. This analysis does not support the hypothesis that municipalities
with Mayor-Council forms of government will have higher voter participation than
those with other, reformed forms of government such as Council-Manager,
Administrator-Council, and Council despite the literature to date.
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Figure 6 shows the comparison of average registration in municipalities with partisan
ballots and either the Mayor-Council or Council form of government to those with
both nonpartisan ballots and Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms of
government, or Reform Cities. Over the five observations, average registration for
Reform Cities was 70.80% and for municipalities using partisan ballots and other
forms of government was 74.54%. The bivariate analysis in Figure 6 supports the
assertion that Reform Cities have lower participation, here specifically registration.
Figure 6.

Figure 7 shows the comparison of average turnout in municipalities with partisan
ballots and either the Mayor-Council or Council form of government to Reform Cities.
Over the five observations, average turnout for Reform Cities was 62.62% and for
municipalities using partisan ballots and other forms of government was 60.32%. The
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bivariate analysis in Figure 7 does not support the previous literature on the subject or
the expectation that Reform Cities have lower turnout.
Figure 7.

Such bivariate results might be due to a number of factors, such as the timing of the
elections or socioeconomic variance. To address this possibility, random effects
generalized least squares regressions with robust standard error adjusted for clustering
of muni over time were employed.
In the following section, I present the random effects generalized least squares
regressions. As previously mentioned, the model allows for the comparison of
different population groups at specific points in time. It also allows for the comparison
of many variables at the same time, including those which are time-varying and timeinvariant. A random effects model was included as it is assumed that the differences
among the variables are not correlated with the independent variables.
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RESULTS
The multivariate results presented in Table 2 do not provide statistically significant
support for either of the stated hypotheses. The coefficient for the partisanship variable
is positive but small and misses the threshold for statistical significance. Likewise, the
coefficient for Mayor-Council municipalities is positive, but only slightly larger than
that for Council-Manager and Administrator-Council. They also fail to make the
threshold for statistical significance.
Table 2. The Effect of Partisan Ballot Type and Form of Government on Voter Registration

Registration
Estimate Married
Households with Children under 18
Educational Attainment, High School
Educational Attainment, Some College
Foreign Born
Language other than English
Median Household Income
Race, White
Race, Black
Race, Asian
Race, Other
Electoral Competition
Partisanship
Mayor-Council
Council-Manager/Administrator-Council
Time of Election, Midterm
Time of Election, Off-year
Time of Election, Other
Year
constant
number of observations = 190
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

Coef.
-0.146238
-3.011378
0.5626477
0.2682638
-1.005284
1.179292
7.43E-06
1.093647
1.009261
0.307178
0.0833729
-0.0068741
0.0498962
0.1336262
0.1172696
-0.0132557
0.0469643
-0.1170899
0.0052592
-11.33574
0.12752115
0.03490005
0.93031824
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Robust
Standard
Error
1.072094
2.395015
0.8155703
0.4365874
0.5860992
0.3779456
4.56E-06
0.6402177
0.8622962
1.016278
0.212934
0.0068177
0.0305744
0.0867573
0.0767221
0.0039352
0.0827976
0.0675725
0.0016729
3.666669

z
-0.14
-1.26
0.69
0.61
-1.72
3.12
1.63
1.71
1.17
0.3
0.39
-1.01
1.63
1.54
1.53
-3.37
0.57
-1.73
3.14
-3.09

P>|z|
0.892
0.209
0.49
0.539
0.086
0.002
0.104
0.088
0.242
0.762
0.695
0.313
0.103
0.124
0.126
0.001
0.571
0.083
0.002
0.002

(fraction of variance due to u_i)

Table 3 replicates the model from Table 1, but substitutes turnout as the dependent
variable. The results presented in Table 3 provide mixed results. The coefficient for
the Partisanship variable is statistically significant at the .05 level but is negative,
meaning that municipalities with partisan ballots, when controlling for all other factors
in the model, turnout at a lower rate than those with nonpartisan ballots. This does not
support the first hypothesis or the literature on this topic. The coefficient for the
Mayor-Council variable is also statistically significant at the .05 level and negative,
meaning municipalities with that form of government turnout at a lower rate than the
control. The coefficient for the Council-Manager and Administrator-Council variable
is the strongest statistically at the .05 level and is negative, which supports the second
hypothesis and the literature. Turnout in those municipalities occurs at a rate 4.3%
lower than the control.
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Table 3. The Effect of Partisan Ballot Type and Form of Government on Voter Turnout
Turnout
Estimate Married
Households with Children under 18
Educational Attainment, High School
Educational Attainment, Some College
Foreign Born
Language other than English
Median Household Income
Race, White
Race, Black
Race, Asian
Race, Other
Electoral Competition
Partisanship
Mayor-Council
Council-Manager/Administrator-Council
Time of Election, Midterm
Time of Election, Off-year
Time of Election, Other
Year
constant
number of observations = 190
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

Coef.
-0.367989
0.2591412
0.2311904
-0.119606
1.116617
-0.8511025
1.89E-06
-0.6287977
-1.018661
-0.1184795
-0.616103
0.0017943
-0.0313629
-0.0342494
-0.0427629
-0.1091265
-0.3394152
-0.2326071
-0.0087376
18.79599

Robust
Standard Error
0.3708347
0.2436233
0.189778
0.353258
0.3773261
0.1968368
7.53E-07
0.2730819
0.3549362
0.5273183
0.3153377
0.0062345
0.0128258
0.016769
0.0140298
0.0046639
0.0333321
0.0213237
0.0012935
2.676731

z
-0.99
1.06
1.22
-0.34
2.96
-4.32
2.50
-2.30
-2.87
-0.22
-1.95
0.29
-2.45
-2.04
-3.05
-23.40
-10.18
-10.91
-6.75
7.02

P>|z|
0.321
0.287
0.223
0.735
0.003
0.000
0.012
0.021
0.004
0.822
0.051
0.773
0.014
0.041
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.01618556
0.0405743
0.13728432

Table 4 replicates the model from Table 2, but substitutes the variable for the
combination of nonpartisan ballot and Council-Manager and Administrator-Council
form of government, or Reform Cities, for Partisanship and other forms of
government. The results presented in Table 4 are consistent with expectations. Alford
and Lee (1968) and Wood (2002) both employed a similar variable in their analyses
and found the combination of nonpartisan ballots and the Council-Manager form of
government to correlate with lower turnout. Their analyses, however, only looked at
turnout and not registration.
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The variable representing the combination of ballot type and form of government is
statistically significant at the .05 level and negative, meaning that municipalities which
have both nonpartisan ballot and the Council-Manager or Administrator-Council
forms of government register to vote at a lower rate 3 than those with partisan ballots
and reform governments.
Table 4. The Effect of the Combination of Nonpartisan Ballot Type and CouncilManager and Administrator-Manager Form of Government on Voter Registration
Registration
Estimate Married

Coef.

Robust Standard
Error

-0.0430687

1.078428

Households with Children under 18
Educational Attainment, High School
Educational Attainment, Some College

-2.933284
0.3846304
0.2485502

2.422218
0.7844328
0.4153187

Foreign Born
Language other than English
Median Household Income
Race, White
Race, Black
Race, Asian
Race, Other

-0.90977
1.1627
5.88E-06
1.279994
1.258597
0.8597684
0.052426

0.5350147
0.3608438
4.17E-06
0.6384716
0.8731887
1.021757
0.2075007

Electoral Competition
Nonpartisan and CouncilManager/Administrator-Council

-0.0063387

0.0066906

-0.0348704

0.0143088

Time of Election, Midterm
Time of Election, Off-year

-0.0140247
0.0241695

0.0039465
0.0938023

Time of Election, Other
Year

-0.1283271
0.005144

0.0813067
0.0016632

-11.03101

3.649263

constant
number of observations = 190
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

z
0.04
1.21
0.49
0.60
1.70
3.22
1.41
2.00
1.44
0.84
0.25
0.95
2.44
3.55
0.26
1.58
3.09
3.02

P>|z|
0.968
0.226
0.624
0.550
0.089
0.001
0.158
0.045
0.149
0.400
0.801
0.343
0.015
0.000
0.797
0.114
0.002
0.003

0.12567938
0.03494568
0.92823437

Table 5 replicates the model from Table 4, but turnout is substituted as the dependent
variable. The results are counter to expectations and the existing literature. The
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coefficient for the combination variable just misses the threshold for statistical
significance but is positive, meaning that Reform Cities tend turnout to vote at a
higher rate than those with partisan ballots and other forms of government.
Table 5. The Effect of the Combination of Nonpartisan Ballot Type and Council-Manager
and Administrator-Manager Form of Government on Voter Turnout
Turnout
Estimate Married
Households with Children under 18
Educational Attainment, High School
Educational Attainment, Some College
Foreign Born
Language other than English
Median Household Income
Race, White
Race, Black
Race, Asian
Race, Other
Electoral Competition
Nonpartisan and CouncilManager/Administrator-Council

Coef.
-0.3428449
0.2068572
0.3409729
0.0021901
0.7998716
-0.6723239
2.57E-06
-0.7441727
-1.07179
-0.3100743
-0.5506856
-0.0016322

Robust Standard
Error
0.4126972
0.3182104
0.2275487
0.3712666
0.4261308
0.2430414
7.61E-07
0.2690658
0.357863
0.4906737
0.2868441
0.0062309

0.0234148

0.0131286

Time of Election, Midterm
Time of Election, Off-year
Time of Election, Other
Year
constant
number of observations = 190
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

-0.1079845
-0.3220109
-0.2387725
-0.0086333
18.55303

0.0045965
0.0400441
0.0302406
0.0013146
2.725177

z
-0.83
0.65
1.50
0.01
1.88
-2.77
3.38
-2.77
-2.99
-0.63
-1.92
-0.26

P>|z|
0.406
0.516
0.134
0.995
0.061
0.006
0.001
0.006
0.003
0.527
0.055
0.793

1.78
23.49
-8.04
-7.90
-6.57
6.81

0.075
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.02217715
0.04060758
0.22973916

In both models where turnout is the dependent variable, each variable for the time of
election is statistically significant with negative coefficients. Table 3 shows midterm
elections to have turnout at a rate 10.9% lower than elections which occur during
Presidential election years, or general elections. Off-year elections have a turnout rate
33.9% lower than general election years Elections which take place at other times
during the year other than the traditional first Tuesday in November have turnout rates
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23.3% lower than general elections. Table 5 shows similar results. Municipalities
which have nonpartisan ballots, the Council-Manager or Administrator-Council form
of government, and have elections during midterm year have a predicted turnout rate
10.8% lower than those which have partisan ballots, other forms of government and
elections timed with Presidential general elections. Elections held during off years
have a predicted 32.2% lower turnout rate and those timed at another time in the year
have a predicted 23.88% lower rate of turnout than elections held concurrent with
general elections.
Taken together, the bivariate and multivariate analyses offer a mixed bag with regard
to support for either hypothesis. While the bivariate analysis of turnout and
registration between partisan and nonpartisan ballots supports the first hypothesis, the
multivariate analyses for registration finds some support but the multivariate analysis
for turnout yields contradictory statistically significant results. Similarly, the second
hypothesis concerning form of government does not find support in the bivariate
analysis but finds some support in the multivariate analyses.
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DISCUSSION
This analysis of municipal elections has produced a range of results, some of which
seem contradictory. The following discussion will review the major findings, how they
pertain to the stated hypotheses and questions posed at the beginning of the paper, and
offer explanation for some of the apparent inconsistencies in the findings.
The existing literature on the effects of ballot type, form of government, and
combinations of the two, on voter participation uses voter turnout as the dependent
variable representing participation. This study looks at two forms of participation,
voter registration and voter turnout. Because voting is contingent on registration, it is
logical that each represent participation. Likewise, it is logical that there would be
differences between registration and turnout because they are two specific and distinct
actions8.
Major Findings
The first hypothesis, testing the relationship between nonpartisan municipal ballots
and voter participation, found support in the initial bivariate analysis which shows that
municipalities utilizing partisan ballots have higher rates of registration and turnout.
The multivariate analysis of voter registration, while missing the threshold for
statistical significance, shows additional meager support. The multivariate analysis of
turnout, however, suggests that municipalities with partisan ballots turnout at rates
lower that those with nonpartisan ballots. This is counter to the expectations and
literature on this topic. Multiple studies examining the relationship between ballot type

8

This is true in Rhode Island which does not currently allow for same-day voter registration.
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and turnout have found lower voter turnout in municipalities using nonpartisan ballots
(Alford and Lee 1968, Hawley 1973, Karnig and Walter 1983, Schaffner, Streb and
Wright 2001, C. Wood 2002).
The second hypothesis, testing the relationship between forms of municipal
government and voter participation, did not find support in the initial bivariate
analysis. This analysis shows that, counter to expectations, municipalities with
Council forms of government tend to have higher rates of registration than those with
Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms and markedly higher rates than
those with Mayor-Council forms of government. Similarly, the bivariate analysis of
turnout shows Council forms of government to have higher rates of turnout than the
Council-Manager and Administrator-Council governments and that the latter forms
have higher rates of turnout than the Mayor-Council municipalities. These results are
counter to both expectations and extant literature on the topic. Multiple studies
examining the relationship between forms of government and turnout have found
municipalities which have a Council-Manager form of government tend to have lower
turnout than those with the Mayor-Council form (Alford and Lee 1968, Karnig and
Walter 1983, Bridges 1997, C. Wood 2002).
Of the eight municipalities with the Mayor-Council form of government, three have
significantly lower average turnout rates than any of the municipalities in the entire
state. These include Central Falls, Providence, and Woonsocket with average turnout
rates of 35.83%, 37.47%, and 27.57% respectively. Two of these municipalities,
Central Falls and Woonsocket, also use hold elections during odd-years and use
nonpartisan ballots.
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Because there could be other factors influencing participation, multivariate analyses
are pursued. The second hypothesis finds some support in these analyses, although
both fall short of the threshold for statistical significance at the .01 level. Looking at
registration, Mayor-Council governments have a slightly higher rate of registration
than Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms, and both Mayor-Council and
the combined Council-Manager and Administrator-Council form have higher rates
than the control, Council. This is in line with expectations.
Looking at turnout, however, the results are somewhat puzzling. The coefficients for
both the Mayor-Council and the combined Council-Manager and AdministratorCouncil forms of government are negative and statistically significant, at the .05 level.
This means that the control form of government, Council, has higher rates of turnout
than the Mayor-Council and the combined Council-Manager and AdministratorCouncil forms, which is counter to expectations and literature on this topic. The
coefficient for Mayor-Council form of government is smaller than that for the
combined Council-Manager and Administrator-Council form, which does support the
second hypothesis.
An obvious question here is why are the coefficients negative? The data for the
Mayor-Council form of government contains three municipalities with very low
turnout, as mentioned above. Three of those municipalities have elections which occur
in off years. The coefficient for off year elections in this turnout analysis shows that
turnout is 33.94% lower than turnout in even year general elections. Conversely, the
constant in this Form of Government analysis is the Council form. All five
municipalities which have a Council Form of Government use partisan ballots and
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hold elections during general and midterm years. We know from the bivariate analysis
that the average turnout rate for the Council form is 67.76% while it is 52.65% for the
Mayor-Council form. Perhaps the difference in when elections are held, in addition to
the ballot type and form of government is enough to produce these results.
The data for the Council-Manager and Administrator-Council forms of government,
however, does not have any immediately visible outliers. One municipality,
Jamestown, has consistently lower turnout which is likely influenced by the timing of
their elections but this is hardly enough to significantly impact the entire category. Of
the 26 municipalities in this combined form of government, elections by and large take
place during general and midterm election years. And though the coefficient in this
analysis is negative, meaning that these municipalities turnout at rates lower than the
Council form of government, the value is larger than the coefficient for the MayorCouncil form of government which is in line with expectations and literature.
The third area of analysis looks at participation and Reform Cities, those
municipalities which have both nonpartisan ballots and either Council-Manager or
Administrator-Council form of government. The expectation is that towns and cities
with both of these reform elements will have lower registration and turnout than those
municipalities which have partisan ballots and have either a Mayor-Council or Council
form of government. The multivariate analysis for registration provides statistically
significant support at the .05 level with a negative coefficient. However, the
multivariate analysis for turnout produces a positive coefficient and but does not meet
the threshold for statistical significance. This means that Reform Cities tend to turnout
at a rate higher than municipalities using partisan ballots and which have either a
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Mayor-Council or Council form of government. This is counter to the expectations
and literature on this topic (Alford and Lee 1968, Karnig and Walter 1983, C. Wood
2002).
Similar to the multivariate analysis for the first hypothesis, comparing participation
between municipalities using partisan and nonpartisan ballots, there appears to be a
shift that occurs between registration and turnout. However, it is not immediately
obvious what this shift is.
The timing of elections is important. It appears to be the most influential of the
structural reform variables tested in the analysis of voter turnout. In the multivariate
analyses on turnout, elections not held during general election years are all statistically
significant at the .001 level and have large negative coefficients. These findings are in
line with expectations and extant literature on the topic (Alford and Lee 1968, Hajnal
and Lewis 2003, Hawley 1973, C. Wood 2002).
The multivariate analyses of all models run does not find statistically significant
support for the Electoral Competition variable. This means that, per the construct of
this variable, the relative number of open seats and challengers for any given contest
does not appear to influence either registration or turnout.
Practical Relevance
The findings in these analyses provide further support for a number of assertions about
voter turnout in municipal elections and offer additional information on registration.
The bivariate analysis of the effect of ballot type on both voter registration and turnout
supports the first hypothesis of this study, as well as the extant literature on the
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subject. The findings show that at this basic level, there are higher levels of
participation in municipalities which employ partisan ballots. The multivariate
analysis of form of government and turnout support the second hypothesis of this
study. The findings show that municipalities with Council-Manager or AdministratorCouncil and Council forms of government have lower rates of participation than
municipalities with a Mayor-Council form. The multivariate analysis of Reform Cities
and registration show that municipalities with both elements of Progressive Era
reform, Council-Manager or Administrator-Council forms of government and
nonpartisan ballots, have lower rates of voter registration than other forms of
government which use partisan ballots. This look at registration is a line of study
which not been much discussed in the current literature. Lastly, the multivariate
analyses of turnout provides further support that the timing is elections matter. The
farther a local election is from general elections, the lower the turnout. Policy-wise,
this has clear implications. Not only is it more economical for state and local
governments to have elections for various offices occur at the same time, it is more
economical for the voter.
Limitations
As in the case with any research or empirical study, there are limitations. One
limitation of this study is both political and cultural. Rhode Island is, by and large, a
one-party state. Though the governorship was been occupied by a Republican during
most of the time this study covers, both houses of the state legislature have had
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Democratic majorities since 19789. In June 2013, the voter registration by party was
Republican 10.23%, Democrat 40.12%, Unaffiliated 49.46%, Moderate .19%. Though
almost half of the population is not affiliated with a party, Democratic Party
registration holds a significant lead. During the time covered in this study, 2003
through 2012, the state elected Democrats to the U.S. House of Representatives each
time. In the U.S. Senate, they elected one Democrat and one Republican 10. Rhode
Island has also cast its Electoral College votes for Democratic presidential contenders
in twelve of the past fourteen contests. All of this is to say that there is a lack of strong
competitive parties in the state. This lack of partisan competitive results in a lack of
political innovation by the parties and a lack real alternatives for the electorate
(Hawley 1973). This lack of competition may influence the political behavior of the
electorate. V. O. Key notably articulated the matter of one-party states when he wrote,
“Over the long run the have-nots lose in disorganized politics” (Key 1949, 307).
Another limitation is geography. The data comes from the smallest state in the union,
and one which is located well within a single region. While the similarities within and
between the municipalities may decrease the overall variance in the data, the lack of
variety may play an important and unmeasured role in the analyses.
As previously mentioned in the Data and Methods section, the data for New Shoreham
is problematic. It is impossible for a city or town to have over 100% registration. This
is a problem one finds when collecting such data in any part of the United States.

9

The National Conference of State Legislatures provides historical data going back to 1978.
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx
10
That Republican, Lincoln Chafee, went on to change his party affiliation twice. At the time of this
writing, he is a Democrat and the Governor of Rhode Island.
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/lincoln-chafee-to-switch-parties-sources-say-91994.html
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Although federal elections are regulated at the federal level, all elections are
administrated at the local and county levels. This means there can be wide variations
in the collection, filing, storing, cleaning, and saving of said data.
One possible limitation of the statistical analysis is that the random effects generalized
least squares model used only a random intercept which assumes that variance and
covariance of the variables over time are equal. However the model used was shown
to account for a substantial amount of clustering within communities which provides
does provide robust test of model effects. A more precise estimate might be obtained
using models with covariance structure which allow for variation over time.
Further Research
In keeping with the previous section on limitations, there are two areas for further
research and study which would provide immeasurable assistance to the study of
municipal elections and voting behavior. One possibility is the creation of a central
database of municipal data. The lack of consistency in collection and storage of such
data, as well as the difficulty in accessing the data create barriers. Luckily, Rhode
Island’s electoral results are readily available on an easy to access website. The
relatively low number of cities and towns made it feasible not only to collect the data
but to contact local canvass offices for additional information when needed. However,
it still took a significant amount of time to collect all of the necessary data. When I
initially began research for this study, I was surprised to learn that there is not one
readily accessible place which can definitely tell you how many municipalities in the
United States use nonpartisan ballots, or specifically have a Council-Manager from of
government. There are resources, such as the International City/County Management
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Association (ICMA) which produces the Municipal Yearbook, but they rely on survey
data. If there was a central database which housed municipal data, I would venture the
number of studies would increase, thereby increasing understanding in a variety of
topics which could have important policy implications.
Another opportunity for further research would be to replicate this study in other
states, even the entire remaining forty-nine. Replication of the study in other states
would offer valuable scholarship on the topic. By increasing the number of locations
studied, more would not only be known about those individual states, but more
comparison and analysis between states could occur. Such an undertaking would, of
course, be made much easier is a central database of easily accessible municipal data
existed.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to test the effect of two structural reforms on voter
participation in municipal elections. The findings and analysis add to the current
literature on the topics of urban reform and voter participation and also contribute to a
greater understanding of municipal elections in Rhode Island. It marks the first study
to evaluate ballot type and form of government over five electoral observations in an
entire state and in Rhode Island.
It is clear from this research that structure matters when it comes to voter participation
in local elections. The kind of ballot, partisan or nonpartisan, the municipal form of
government, and the timing of elections each impact the rates at which citizens
register and turnout to vote. For policy makers with an interest in boosting voter
participation at the local level, there are lessons in these findings.
Earlier in 2014, I was asked to consult on the proposals for charter reform in the city
of Newport, RI. Generally, they were interested in ways to increase civic engagement
and voter participation. More specifically, they were evaluating a number of structural
reforms including the way in which the mayor is elected, whether or not to change
from a hybrid system of ward and at-large elections of councilors to all ward or all atlarge, and what the current form of government really means with regard to
accountability and responsibility. Due to my work on this thesis, I was able to provide
the charter reform committee with information about the current literature on the areas
of interest which I have studied. I also offered ballot type, moving from nonpartisan to
partisan, as another element to consider. Now that this study is completed, I can offer
the committee research on these topics which was conducted on Rhode Island. The
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findings go beyond a single state, however. The scope of this study allows the findings
analysis to be used in future research on the topics covered.
“About all that can be concluded about voting in state and local elections is that
scholars have a wonderful opportunity to narrow our focus of ignorance” (Key 1958,
614).
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APPENDIX I
Descriptive Statistics
Municipalities in Rhode Island
Ballot Type
Partisan

30

Nonpartisan

9

Form of Government
Administrator-Council

10

Council

8

Council-Manager

16

Mayor-Council

5

Electoral System
At-Large

26

Ward

8

Hybrid

5

Two Years

32

Four Years

7

Council Terms

Electoral Observations
Timing of Elections
General
Mid-term
Off-year
Other

1

2

3

4

5

36
2
1

36
2
1

36
3
-

36
3
-

36
2*
-

*The missing municipality for this observation is Central Falls
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APPENDIX II
STATA Syntax Code
The first model which tests registration against partisanship and form of government
uses the following syntax:
. xtreg Percent_Registration Percent_EstMarried Percent_TotHouseKidsUnd18
Percent_EdAttHS Percent_EdAttSColl Percent_ForBorn Percent_LangOtherEng Med
HHIncome Percent_RaceWhite Percent_RaceBlack Percent_RaceAsian Percent_RaceOth
Challenger_ElectComp Partisanship FoG_MC FoG_CMAC ToE_MT ToE_OY To E_OX
Year, cluster (Muni_Code)

The second model, which tests turnout against partisanship and form of government
uses the following syntax:
. xtreg Percent_Turnout Percent_EstMarried Percent_TotHouseKidsUnd18
Percent_EdAttHS Percent_EdAttSColl Percent_ForBorn Percent_LangOtherEng
MedHHIncome Percent_RaceWhite Percent_RaceBlack Percent_RaceAsian Percent_RaceOth
Challenger_ElectComp Partisanship FoG_MC FoG_CMAC ToE_MT ToE_OY ToE_OX
Year, cluster (Muni_Code)

The third model, which tests registration against the combined variable of
Nonpartisanship and Reform Form of Government uses the following syntax:
. xtreg Percent_Registration Percent_EstMarried Percent_TotHouseKidsUnd18
Percent_EdAttHS Percent_EdAttSColl Percent_ForBorn Percent_LangOtherEng
MedHHIncome Percent_RaceWhite Percent_RaceBlack Percent_RaceAsian Percent_RaceOth
Challenger_ElectComp NP_And_CMAC ToE_MT ToE_OY ToE_OX Year, cluster
(Muni_Code)
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The fourth model, which tests turnout against the combined variable of
Nonpartisanship and Reform Form of Government uses the following syntax:
. xtreg Percent_Turnout Percent_EstMarried Percent_TotHouseKidsUnd18
Percent_EdAttHS Percent_EdAttSColl Percent_ForBorn Percent_LangOtherEng
MedHHIncome Percent_RaceWhite Percent_RaceBlack Percent_RaceAsian Percent_RaceOth
Challenger_ElectComp NP_And_CMAC ToE_MT ToE_OY ToE_OX Year, cluster (Mun
i_Code)
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